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COST RECOVERY OR CONTRIBUTION FOR
"SUBSTANTIALLY INNOCENT PRPs" UNDER CERCLA?:
MORRISON ENTERPRISES V. MCSHARES, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Between September 1, 2001, and August 31, 2002, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided one case that re-
quired it to interpret two sections of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").' That case,
Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.2 is the principal case addressed
in this survey. Under CERCLA, any party that has spent money to re-
spond to a hazardous waste release, whether a federal or state govern-
ment or a private party, may recoup the costs from parties that may have
also contributed to the contamination. 3 In litigation under CERCLA, "po-
tentially responsible parties" are referred to as "PRPs. ' 4 When private
parties who are potentially liable clean sites themselves, they may later
sue other PRPs to recoup part of their expenses.5 This survey primarily
examines the relationship between §§ 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA in
actions between private parties.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the principal
agency that administers CERCLA on behalf of the United States, 6 can
enforce the Act in a number of ways. For example, the EPA can clean the
contaminated site itself using money from the "Superfund, ' 7 issue ad-
ministrative compliance orders directing the PRPs to clean the site,8 or
petition a district court for an injunction to force a PRP to clean a con-
taminated site.9 In addition to the federal government, state governments
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-75 (2000). The text of this survey will refer to the statute as the law was originally enacted,
CERCLA §§ 101-175. The footnotes of this survey, however, will refer to the most current version
of the Act as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-75 (2000).
2. 302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002).
3. See Richard D. Buckley, Jr., Note & Comment, Making A Case for Statutory Amendment
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA "):
Solving the Section 107/Section 113 Cause of Action Controversy, 31 TULSA L.J. 851, 851, 852
(1996).
4. Joel Wertman, Comment, The Importance of the Brownfields Revitalization and Economic
Restoration Act in Promoting Brownfields Redevelopment, 20 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 267, 273
(2002).
5. Buckley, supra note 3, at 854.
6. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 42 C.F.R. 52 (1987) (delegating executive enforcement
powers to the EPA Administrator).
7. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE SUPERFUND RESPONSE PROCESS (1998) (explaining that
the Superfund is a trust fund created to pay for cleanup actions), available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfundlcontacts/stbotlne/resp.pdf.
8. Wertman, supra note 4, at 273.
9. Id.
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and Indian tribes may also bring suits under CERCLA in order to facili-
tate cleanup of contaminated sites. °
Private parties and the government may recoup cleanup costs under
CERCLA through a § 107(a) cost recovery action or a § 113(f) contribu-
tion claim.'" A cost recovery action under CERCLA is a lawsuit brought
by a governmental or private party under § 107(a) to recover cleanup
expenses from the parties responsible for the contamination., 2 The EPA
and other parties who have cleaned a site can shift liability for the cost of
the cleanup to PRPs under § 107(a).13 In order to recover expenses from
PRPs, a plaintiff must prove that "(1) the defendant is a PRP, (2) the site
is a facility, (3) a release or threatened release of hazardous substance[s]
has occurred," and "(4) the release caused the plaintiff to incur response
costs.' 4 Under § 107(a), strict liability theory applies and liability is
joint and several, 15 unless the harm is divisible. 16 A defendant can avoid
liability under § 107(a) by establishing an affirmative defense. 17 The
statute of limitations under § 107(a) is six years.'
8
On the other hand, contribution actions are brought under § 113(f)
of CERCLA.19 Pursuant to § 113(0, "any person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section
[1]07(a).,,20 Black's Law Dictionary defines contribution as "[a] tortfea-
sor's right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
tortfeasor has paid more than his ... proportionate share.",2' Therefore,
contribution allows a party who has incurred a disproportionate share of
response costs to identify other PRPs to share the liability. 2 A party who
may be partially responsible for a spill, and hence a PRP, may use this
section to lessen his expenses by suing and recouping costs from other
PRPs. 23 Contribution suits may arise in three contexts: (1) when the gov-
10. - 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (f)(1) (2000).
11. Wertman, supra note 4, at 273; ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 215 (5th ed. 2000).
12. OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 171 (2d ed. 2001).
13. Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy Over
CERCLA Claims Brought By Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 89
(1997).
14. Wertman, supra note 4, at 274.
15. Ricky Pearce, Comment, A Call for a New Policy Toward CERCLA Cleanup Costs in the
Eighth Circuit: Is it Fair to Punish the PRP Who Initiates the Cleanup at a Superfund Site?, 7 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 126, 126 (2000).
16. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 213.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).
18. Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B) ("An initial action for the recovery of the costs referred to in section
[107] ... must be commenced.., for a remedial action, within 6 years after the initiation of physical
on-site construction of the remedial action").
19. Buckley, supra note 3, at 852.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (7th ed. 1999).
22. See MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 212.
23. Daniel C. Chang, Comment, CERCLA: The Problems of Limiting Contribution Claims for
Potentially Responsible Parties, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2002).
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ernment sues but does not sue all PRPs and the parties named in the gov-
ernment action initiate a subsequent lawsuit for contribution "against the
remaining unnamed PRPs; (2) when a private party incurring response
costs does not name all PRPs in its reimbursement action and ... [later
contribution claims] are brought by the named PRPs against remaining
unnamed PRPs; and (3) when one PRP brings a private action to recover
response costs against another PRP.' 24
Under § 113(f), only several liability attaches to a defendant. 25 To
establish this liability, the plaintiff must ascertain the defendant's share
of the cleanup costs. 26 "In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate. 27 The statute of limitations un-
der § 113(f) is three years.28
The majority of the circuit courts of appeals have held that PRPs
may only recoup cleanup costs under § 113(f), but not under § 107(a). 9
Courts that do not allow a PRP to bring a § 107(a) claim do so in large
part because a PRP by definition is a party responsible for some of the
contamination at the site.30 These courts believe that allowing a party
partly responsible for the contamination to reap the benefits of § 107(a)
disregards the very purposes of CERCLA. 31 A plaintiff usually prefers to
sue under § 107(a) because of the several procedural advantages it offers
over § 113(f), which can produce very favorable outcomes for the plain-
tiff.
32
However, the solutions to the controversy proposed in this survey
offer a compromise to these majority courts that protects the original
goal of CERCLA. That goal is the expedient "and voluntary cleanup of
hazardous waste sites" by the party that contaminated the site.33 This
long-standing controversy could be resolved if courts adopted solutions
such as the ones discussed below, Congress amended CERCLA to clarify
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f), or the United States Supreme
Court definitively ruled on the issue.
24. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 213.
25. Christine D. McGuire, Case Note, Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.: The
Potentially Responsible Party's Right to Full Cost Recovery is Expanded, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 511,
522 (1998).
26. Wertman, supra note 4, at 274.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
28. Id. § 9613 (g)(3) ("No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than 3 years after- (A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for
recovery of such costs or damages, or (B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g)
of this title... or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.").
29. Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
30. Id.
31. Lisa M. Glanvill, Note, The Superfund's Superproblem: Will Congress Clean Up the
Hazardous Wasteland of the Section 107/Section 113 Standing Controversy?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 153, 178 (1997).
32. Pearce, supra note 15, at 127.
33. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 86.
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Part I of this survey is a broad introduction to the CERCLA statute.
Part II explains the long-standing controversy over when parties are able
to bring a cost recovery action versus a contribution action. Part III dis-
cusses the Tenth Circuit's application of the statute in Morrison. Part IV
outlines cases decided by the Seventh Circuit that hold contrary to the
majority of the United States Courts of Appeal. Part V explains the posi-
tions that the remaining circuits take on the controversy. Finally, Part VI
is a critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Morrison decision as well as
an analysis of the minority view on the controversy. Part VII proposes
solutions to the controversy that take into account the policy considera-
tions that led Congress to enact CERCLA.
I. CERCLA
A. Background
In response to the Love Canal hazardous waste disaster in 1979, 34
Congress enacted CERCLA, also known as the "Superfund" law,35 in
December 1980.36 At the time that the CERCLA was enacted, other laws
were in force that dealt with improper disposal of hazardous wastes and
contamination of water-among them, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 197637 and the Clean Water Act of 1972. 8 However,
these statutes did not directly address the cleanup of most contaminated
sites and were not sufficiently comprehensive. 39 For example, the cost of
cleaning hazardous waste sites has soared astronomically over the past
two decades. In the 1980s the average cost to clean a single site ranged
"from six to ten million dollars per site."4 Today, "the cost has increased
to nearly thirty to fifty million dollars. ' 4i To address these costs,
CERCLA imposes harsh penalties on parties responsible for releasing
hazardous wastes into the environment. In a traditional cost recovery
action, a party can potentially incur "the total of all costs of response plus
$50,000,000 for any damages. 42 A court can impose treble damages to
penalize a party who "fails without sufficient cause" to clean a site.43
34. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 159. In Niagara Falls, New York, the Board of Educa-
tion built an elementary school over the Love Canal dumpsite of highly toxic waste. Id. Local offi-
cials then allowed construction of a residential subdivision next to that contaminated site. Id. Follow-
ing the evacuation of over 230 families from the area, residents brought suit seeking over two billion
dollars for personal injury, including many miscarriages, birth defects, and catastrophic property
damage. Id.
35. Id. at 205.
36. Id. at 159.
37. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000).
38. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
39. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 156; McGuire, supra note 25, at 512; John M. Hyson, "Fair-
ness" and Joint and Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 139 (1997).
40. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (2000).
43. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
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Accordingly, CERCLA has had a tremendous impact on shifting cleanup
costs from the taxpayer to the parties responsible for releasing the haz-
ardous wastes into the environment."a
Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 "with the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). 45 In addition to increasing
the Superfund coffers, SARA codified the right of contribution for par-
ties that initially bore the cost of site cleanup in § 113.46 By amending
CERCLA in this way, Congress attempted to "clarify and confirm a judi-
cially established right to contribution under ... [§] 107." 47 Before
SARA, CERCLA contained no express mechanism for a party to recover
from another when it paid more than its share of cleanup costs. 48 SARA
also added § 113(f)(2) to CERCLA.49 This section grants statutory pro-
tection from § 113(f) contribution claims to any PRP who settles with the
United States government. 50 This section however, does not protect a
PRP from future § 107(a) cost recovery claims.51
Finally, CERCLA liability is retroactive, meaning that the EPA may
hold parties liable for the costs of cleaning releases that occurred before
the statute's 1980 enactment.52 "This holds true even if the" release "was
customary and legal" when it occurred.53
B. Purpose
CERCLA's "purpose is to establish a 'comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.' ',54 One of
the goals of the Act is, therefore, to facilitate the expedient and voluntary
cleanup of environmentally contaminated sites, "such as old landfills,
industrial sites, and mining sites. 55 The "second goal is to encourage the
careful handling of hazardous wastes. 56 CERCLA accomplishes this by
shifting the costs of cleanup efforts from taxpayers to parties responsible
44. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
45. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
47. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
48. In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1118 (3dCir. 1997).
49. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
51. Martin A. McCrory, Who's on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and Protec-
tion, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 3, 25 (1999).
52. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND LIABILITY, ENFORCEMENT, AND SETTLEMENTS 7-8
(1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/contactslsfhotlne/liab.pdf.
53. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 208.
54. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Pub. Serv. Co. Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)).
55. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108; see McGuire, supra note 25, at 516.
56. Chang, supra note 23, at 1108.
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for releasing the hazardous waste into the environment. 57 This is known
as the "polluter pays" principal.58
C. Determining Liability
Section 107(a) makes "covered persons" liable for contamination of
property. 59 There are four categories of covered people: (1) owners and
operators of facilities where the spill occurred, ° (2) any party that owned
or operated the facility where the spill occurred at the time the hazardous
substances were disposed of at the facility,61 (3) any party that arranged
for the disposal of hazardous substances at the facility,62 and (4) any
party that accepted hazardous waste for transport to the facility if that
party selected the facility as the destination for the waste.63 Plaintiffs
may recover "any ... necessary costs of response incurred." 64 Once the
EPA or a private party identifies the PRPs and a PRP incurs or antici-
pates the extent of the cleanup costs, a court determines the extent of
each PRP's liability.65 "The extent of liability determines whether" a
court will hold a party responsible for all or only part of the cleanup ex-
penses.66
D. Defenses to CERCLA Liability-§ 107(b)
Section 107(b) provides very limited defenses to liability. It reads in
relevant part:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish ... that the release ... of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the de-
fendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the'de-
fendant... if the defendant establishes ... that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substances concerned ... and (b)
he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions.
67
57. McCrory, supra note 51, at 9.
58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
60. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
61. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
62. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
63. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
64. Id. § 9607(a)(I).
65. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 204-05.
66. Id. at 205.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3).
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People rarely invoke the first two defenses and the facts of a case only
rarely justify their application. 68 The third defense, often called the "in-
nocent landowner defense", remains the most frequently used. 69 It "ap-
propriately applie[s] if the contamination did not occur in connection
with a 'contractual relationship,' such as where a third party dumps
waste in the middle of the night on the defendant's property.,, 70 The in-
nocent landowner defense shifts the burden of proving causation to the
defendants to prove that a contractual relationship exists. 71 The defen-
dants must then prove that the third party's acts or omissions were the
sole cause of the release, the defendant exercised due care, and the de-
fendant took precautions against any foreseeable acts and omissions by
the third party and against the foreseeable consequences of any acts or
72omissions.
E. Advantages of a § 107(a) Claim Versus a § 113(f) Claim
Plaintiffs would prefer to bring claims under § 107(a) rather than §
113(f) because of the advantages a cost recovery claim offers over a con-
73tribution claim. However, courts only reluctantly allow a PRP to bring
cost recovery actions against other PRPs.74
The most significant advantage of recovery under § 107(a) is that a
plaintiff can recover all cleanup costs from a defendant if a court finds
the defendant joint and severally liable under a strict liability theory.75
Joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to recover damages from any
one of the defendants.7 6 Black's Law Dictionary defines strict liability as
"[l]iability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm,
but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe. 77 A court automatically considers a party "to be 'strictly liable' if'
the party is one of the four types of PRPs. 78 If, for example, the EPA
brings an action against a PRP under § 107 and wins a joint and several
judgment, "the EPA may recover all of the cleanup costs of the cleanup
from that [single] PRP., 7 9 If there are other PRPs, then the PRP who was
sued by the EPA may only obtain judgments against the other PRPs for
their "proportionate shares of the liability."80 That PRP "may not fully
68. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 52, at 9.
69. Id.
70. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 218.
71. Id.
72. McCrory, supra note 51, at 15-17.
73. See Glanvill, supra note 31, at 164.
74. McGuire, supra note 25, at 523-24.
75. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 84; McGuire, supra note 24, at 523.
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999) ("Liability that may be apportioned either
among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of the group .... Thus, each
liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation").
77. Id.
78. MOYA & FONO, supra note 12, at 210.
79. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 84 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 84-85.
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shift liability [to another PRP] as the EPA can in its cost recovery ac-
tion."8' Finally § 107(a) has a longer statute of limitations than §
82113(f)-six years as opposed to three.
By contrast, if a plaintiff brings a § 1 13(f) claim, he does not have
as many procedural advantages as he would under § 107(a). 3 This fact
gives the defendant several advantages that he would have not had if the
plaintiff sued under § 107(a).8 4 Under § 113(f), the court equitably allo-
cates liability based on care and fault.85 The defendant then has the op-
portunity to lessen his response costs. 86 This in turn may leave the plain-
tiff responsible for more than his fair share of cleanup CoStS. 87 Also, li-
ability is several under § 113(f), as opposed to joint and several liability
under § 107(a).88 Therefore, each defendant remains liable only for "its
proportionate share of the total response costs, and is not responsible for
costs" attributable to others, such as orphan shares discussed below. 9
Another important difference between claims under the two sections
is the effect of § 113(f)(2) on each. As noted above, § 113(f)(2) provides
statutory protection from § 113(f) contribution claims to PRPs who settle
their liability for contaminating a site with the United States govern-
ment.90 This section, however, does not explicitly protect a PRP from
future § 107(a) cost recovery claims brought by non-settling parties.9' In
addition, plaintiffs may still bring other claims not included in that set-
tlement.92 So PRPs prohibited from bringing a contribution action under
§ 113(f) often choose to bring a § 107(a) action in an attempt to avoid the
protections of § 113(f)(2). 93
II. THE CONTROVERSY
After Congress enacted SARA, two express causes of action were
available to a party that incurred response costs.94 However, Congress
did not specify whether PRPs have standing to bring § 107(a) cost recov-
ery actions or whether CERCLA limits PRPs to contribution actions un-
der § 1 13(f).95 As a result, federal courts disagree about how to interpret
81. Id. at 85.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B), (g)(3).
83. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 127-28.
84. Id. at 128.
85. McCrory, supra note 51, at 23. Under § 113(f)(1), "the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1).
86. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
87. Id.; Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
88. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
89. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
91. Id.
92. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 165.
93. Buckley, supra note 3, at 863.
94. McGuire, supra note 25, at 523.
95. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 155.
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this new language. 96 An outgoing Congress hastily enacted CERCLA "in
the closing days of a lame-duck session," so the scarce legislative history
does not help to clarify this confusion.
97
The broad language of § 107(a)(4)(B) states that PRPs are liable for
"any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.' 98
This language makes it seem that a PRP can file a cost recovery action.
99
However, CERCLA's history and case law have indicated otherwise.' °°
Most courts of appeals, despite the vague language of the statute, have
held that the remedies available to PRPs are limited depending on the
party's motivation for seeking cost recovery under § 107(a). 0' After
SARA codified the right to contribution, courts disagreed over whether
PRPs could bring cost recovery claims or whether they were limited to
contribution claims. 102
A large factor in this controversy is costs called orphan shares.1
0 3
Orphan shares are the response costs that are attributable to insolvent or
unidentifiable entities.' °4 These response costs can be quite substantial in
multimillion-dollar litigation cases. 10 5 Under § 107(a), all parties bear the
orphan share costs except the plaintiff. 1°6 Under § 113(f), the court has
the authority to equitably allocate orphan shares among plaintiffs and
defendants. 0 7 Therefore under § 113(f), the plaintiff may also bear the
costs of orphan shares.
0 8
Courts have essentially taken three different approaches to the con-
troversy. 1°9 The majority of courts of appeals have adopted the first ap-
proach and interpret CERCLA to mean that PRPs may only sue for con-
tribution under § 113(f) to recoup cleanup costs and may not sue under §
107(a) for cost recovery." 0 According to the minority of courts of ap-
peals that have adopted the second approach, PRPs may sue under §
107(a) for joint and several liability to recoup cleanup costs."' Under the
96. Buckley, supra note 3, at 857.
97. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 83.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
99. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 104-05.
100. Buckley, supra note 3, at 852.
101. Ann Alexander, Standing Under Superfund §§ 107 and 113: Avoiding the Error of the
Blind Man and the Elephant (pt. 1), 10 Toxics L. REP. 155, 155 (1995). For example, if a PRP is
bringing a § 107(a) cost recovery action simply to take advantage of the longer statute of limitations
or to circumvent § 113(f)(2) protection, courts generally disallow the § 107(a) claim. Id. However, if
the PRP is bringing the § 107(a) claim in order to seek joint and several liability, courts are more
willing to allow the claim. Id.
102. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 105.
103. Id. at 84; Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
104. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL E7 AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 323 (3d ed. 2000).
105. Buckley, supra note 3, at 858.
106. Pearce, supra note 15, at 128.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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third approach, PRPs are allowed to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery claim,
but liability is determined the same way as in claims for contribution
under § 113(f). 12 A PRP who bore the entire cost of a cleanup will want
to share responsibility for any orphan shares with other PRPs." 3 How-
ever, if the court imposes several liability and requires the other PRPs to
pay only for their shares of the liability, the PRP who bore the cost of the
cleanup cannot share the orphan shares.'
14
The U.S. Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on this issue.
115
However, in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,1 16 the Court stated that
CERCLA "expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in §
113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping rem-
edy in § 107."'' l Key Tronic and several other PRPs contaminated a
landfill. 1 8 It filed suit to recover the costs of cleaning the site under §
107(a)." 9 The Court held that Key Tronic could recover the portion of
the costs related to identifying other PRPs under § 107(a)(4)(B). 12° Ac-
cording to some courts, this ruling implies that a PRP has standing to
assert a response claim under § 107.121 Other courts, however, disagree
and hold that the references to § 107 were dicta and, therefore, Key
Tronic "provides no guidance on the issue."'
122
Before Morrison, the Tenth Circuit last addressed this issue in
United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.123 In Colorado &
Eastern, the United States sued all known PRPs, including the defendant,
the current owner of the site, and the plaintiff, the previous owner of the
site.' 24 The plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant for cost
recovery under § 107(a).' 25 The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
claim could only proceed with an action for contribution under §
113(f).126 The court reasoned that "[t]here is no disagreement that both
parties are PRPs by virtue of their past or present ownership of the site;
therefore, any claim that would reapportion costs between these parties is
the quintessential claim for contribution.' 27 The court stated that "were
PRPs . .. allowed to recover... from other PRPs under § 107's strict
112. Id.
113. See id. at 85.
114. Id.
115. Pearce, supra note 15, at 129.
116. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
117. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816.
118. Id. at 811.
119. Id. at 812.
120. Id. at 820.
121. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 129.
122. Id.
123. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. Colo. E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1533.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1536.
127. Id.
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liability scheme, § 113(f) would be rendered meaningless. 128 The court
focused solely on the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant were PRPs
in barring the plaintiff from bringing a § 107(a) cost recovery claim.
129
Ill. TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
A. Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.130
1. Facts
Morrison Enterprises ("Morrison") owned grain elevators in Salina,
Kansas.' 31 McShares, Inc. ("McShares") supplied grain fumigants, which
contained carbon tetrachloride, to Morrison to use in the grain eleva-
tors. 132 In November 1963, while unloading a delivery to Morrison, a
McShares employee spilled fumigants on Morrison's property. 
133
In 1988, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment
("KDHE") tested water wells on the property next to Morrison's and
found carbon tetrachloride contamination. 134 KDHE issued an adminis-
trative order requiring Morrison to investigate the contamination. 135 Mor-
rison then hired an environmental consulting firm to investigate the con-
tamination. 136 Thereafter, Morrison entered into a consent order with
KDHE in 1992, under which Morrison agreed to investigate and to clean
up the spill. 137 By 1997, Morrison had spent over $430,000 to comply
with the consent order. 38 Morrison then sued McShares, seeking mone-
tary damages to recover cleanup costs and a declaratory judgment that
McShares would be liable for future cleanup costs.
139
Morrison failed to comply with the district court's disclosure dead-
lines, so district court issued a preclusion order that prevented Morrison
from calling expert witnesses at trial. 1 At the 1997 trial, the district
court excluded some of Morrison's evidence because of the preclusion
order.14 1 However, it found that Morrison met its burden of establishing
all but two of the prima facie elements of liability under CERCLA.
142
The court found that Morrison's inability to call expert witnesses fatally
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002).







138. Id. at 1130-31.
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affected its ability to meet its burden on the above two points. 43 The
court ordered judgment for McShares on monetary claims and declara-
tory judgment for Morrison on prima facie elements of liability.'" Mor-
rison appealed, arguing that the court should have issued a declaratory




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating
that in Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.146 it held that "where one PRP
sues another PRP for reimbursement of cleanup costs . . . the plaintiff
PRP must proceed under the contribution provisions of § [1]13(f) and is
barred from proceeding under § [1]07(a). 14 7 The Tenth Circuit noted
that in order to determine whether Morrison could proceed under §
107(a), the court had to determine whether or not Morrison was a PRP.148
It concluded that Morrison was a PRP because it owned the facility,
unless it qualified for one of the defenses described in § 107(b). 49 Morri-
son argued that it qualified for one of these defenses.1 50 However, the
court dismissed that argument because Morrison had a contractual rela-
tionship with McShares that called for delivery of the fumigant when the
spill occurred. 151 Therefore, Morrison did not qualify for the § 107(b)(3)
third party defense. 1
52
Morrison then argued that even if it did not qualify for a § 107(b)(3)
defense, it was an innocent PRP and the court should allow it to "pursue
recovery under § [1]07(a) because 'it ha[d] no responsibility for the
spill.""' 153 Morrison, attempted to reap the procedural benefits that suing
under § 107(a) offers over § 113(f), claiming that Sun Co. created an
"innocent PRP" exception to the rule that PRPs cannot bring suit under §
107(a).
154
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that
a PRP who does not qualify for a defense under § 107(b)(3) may still
pursue an action under § 107(a) if the PRP establishes "innocent" land-
owner status sufficiently. 55 The court also stated that a few federal
courts of appeals' decisions have also indicated in dicta that even PRPs
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1132.
146. 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
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who cannot rely on the § 107(b) defenses might still proceed under §
107(a) if their liability results solely from their status as landowner and
not from contribution to the contamination. 5 6 However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit pointed out that it did not decide the issue in Sun Co. as Morrison
argued.157 More emphatically though, the court stated that the Seventh
Circuit's exception does not comport with the underlying purposes of
CERCLA.'58
The Tenth Circuit noted that under § 107(a), if the landowner suc-
cessfully establishes the defendant's liability, the entire cost automati-
cally shifts to the defendant under strict joint and several liability.5 9
However, under § 113(f), even if the landowner proves the defendant's
liability, the landowner must also prove how liability should be divided
between the parties, "including, potentially, the plaintiffs."' 60 Therefore,
under § 113(f), "'innocent PRPs' may bear some of the costs.' 16 1 The
Tenth Circuit doubted that this would ever be the case though because
truly innocent PRPs should be apportioned the entire cost.'
62
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Morrison was a PRP because it
was the landowner and because it could not rely on the § 107(b) de-
fenses.163 As a PRP, the court concluded that it could only proceed with a
contribution action under § 1 13(f).164
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS
In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also prohibit a PRP from bringing a §
107(a) recovery action. 165 The majority of circuit courts reason that all
PRPs are by definition responsible parties and must, therefore, contribute
to cleanup costs. 166
A. First Circuit
In United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.,
167
the First Circuit held that a liable party could only recoup costs under §
156. Id.
157. Id. "We express no opinion on whether PRPs who assert their innocence with regard to
any waste at a site may be able to recover all of their costs from other PRPs in an action under §
107." Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1191 n.1.
158. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1134.
159. Id.





165. Chang, supra note 23, at 1121. The Eighth Circuit has not decided a case on point, but has
indicated that it would bar PRPs from bringing a § 107(a) action. Id.; Pearce, supra note 15, at 126;
see Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit also
has not directly ruled on this issue. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 130.
166. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
167. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
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113(f).168 In United, the Plaintiff entered into a consent decree with gov-
ernment officials and some other PRPs and incurred significant costs in
the cleanup. 169 The Plaintiff then sued several parties alleging the Defen-
dants were "wholly or partially responsible" for the contamination.1
7 0
The court, noted that the Plaintiff admitted that it was liable and rejected
the possibility of a cost recovery claim because "it is sensible to assume
that Congress intended only innocent parties--not parties who were




In In re Reading Co.,172 the Third Circuit held that "in an action
which presents a claim for apportionment of clean-up costs, § 113(f)
trumps § 107(a)(4)(B).' 173 There, Conrail, a PRP, sued the bankrupt
Reading Co. under § 107(a) for cleanup costs of a site in Douglassville,
Pennsylvania. 74 The Court stated that "a principal goal of § 113(f) was
to 'clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the right of a person held jointly and severally
liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other [PRPs], when the
person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that
may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances. '"1 75 The
Court concluded that § 113(f) "replaced the judicially created right to
contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B)."' 176 It said that Conrail sought contri-
bution from Reading and that "such a claim must be brought under §
113(f), not under § 107(a)."'177 In the end, however, the court held Read-
ing not liable to Conrail because of Reading was bankrupt.1
78
In New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,179 the Third Cir-
cuit held that a PRP landfill owner could only bring a § 113(f) contribu-
tion claim against other PRPs.180 The owner-operator of a contaminated
landfill sued, claiming the defendant was responsible "for all or part of
the response costs incurred" in cleaning up the site.' 81 The court held that
the plaintiff could not bring an action for cost recovery 82 and noted that
§§ 107 and 113 work together to "provide" and "regulate" a PRP's right
168. United, 33 F.3d at 100-01.
169. Id. at 97.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 100.
172. 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997).
173. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1117.
174. Id. at 1116.
175. Id. at 1119 (first two alterations in original).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1121.
178. Id. at 1126.
179. 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997).
180. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 280 (quoting New Castle, 111 F.3d at 1120).
181. NewCastle, IIIF.3d at 1119.
182. Id. at 1126.
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to contribution. 83 The court recognized that "[s]ection 113 provides po-





In Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co.,185 Axel operated
a petroleum refinery on the piece of property that was at issue. 18 6 Axel
left the property in 1984, but by 1995 the EPA discovered extensive con-
tamination. 187 Axel refused to admit liability for the pollution, but en-
tered into an administrative order with the EPA whereby it agreed to pay
for and conduct the cleanup of the property. 188 Axel then sued Carroll,
the current owner of the property, under §§ 107(a) and 113(f) to recover
its cleanup costs. 189 Axel argued that even if it was a PRP, the court
should allow it to bring a cost recovery action because it was an "inno-
cent" party with respect to some of the contamination.1 90 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected this argument and ruled that "potentially responsible per-
sons cannot sue under § 107" because this section "protects the strict
liability scheme created by the statute. ' ' The court explained that the
exception only applies to truly innocent parties, which Axel was not be-
cause overwhelming evidence pointed to Axel as the major polluter. 192
D. Fifth Circuit
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,193 a landowner argued that he did
not know of the contamination when he bought the land that was at is-
sue. 194 However, the court held that the landowner of a contaminated site
shares joint and several liability and limited the landowner to a § 113(f)
claim.195 The court applied both §§ 107(a) and 113(f), using § 107(a) to
determine the existence of liability and § 113(f) to apportion liability.
196
The Fifth Circuit held that a court must ascertain each responsible party's
equitable share of the cleanup costs under CERCLA's contribution pro-
vision. 197
183. Id. at 1122.
184. Id.
185. 191 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 1999).
186. Axel Johnson, 191 F.3d at 412.
187. Id. at 412, 413.
188. Id. at 413.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 415.
191. Id. at 416.
192. Id.
193. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
194. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 666.
195. Id. at 672.
196. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at I 11-12.
197. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 668.
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E. Sixth Circuit
Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.198 in-
volved a PRP seeking to recover the costs of responding to hazardous
waste under § 107(a). 99 Centerior, the plaintiff and parent company of a
previous owner, never contested its status as a PRP and the court held it
liable.200 The court stated that "[c]ost recovery actions by parties not re-
sponsible for site contamination are joint and several cost recovery ac-
tions governed exclusively by § 107(a). Claims by PRPs, however, seek-
ing costs from other PRPs are necessarily actions for contribution, and
are therefore governed by... § 113(f).
20 1
Years earlier, however, in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco,
Inc. ,202 the Sixth Circuit implicitly held that a PRP could bring a § 107(a)
cost recovery action if the PRP voluntarily cleaned up the site.203 In Vel-
sicol, the plaintiff brought a § 107(a) claim, alleging the defendant's re-
sponsibility for the contamination of a site that the plaintiff cleaned up.
2z 4
The court found that the defendant failed to establish one of the § 107(b)
defenses to liability and allowed the plaintiff to bring a cost recovery
action.2 °5 The main distinction between this case and Centerior was that
Velsicol cleaned the site voluntarily,2 6 whereas the EPA issued a unilat-
eral administrative order that led Centerior to cleanup the contamination
at issue there.20 7
F. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp.,2°8 refused to allow the plaintiff-PRP to proceed under § 107(a).2°9
The plaintiff, although it admitted its own liability, commenced an action
to recover the expenses it incurred in the voluntary cleanup from other
PRPs.210 The court stated that "[b]ecause all PRPs are liable under the
statute, a claim by one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for con-
tribution. 21'1 The Ninth Circuit said equity and fairness required that the
plaintiff be limited to a contribution claim, and distributed responsibility
198. 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998).
199. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 346.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 350.
202. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993).
203. See Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 530.
204. Id. at 527.
205. See id. at 530.
206. Id. at 526, 528; see Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
.207. Centerior, 153 F.3d at 346.
208. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
209. See Pearce, supra note 15, at 126; see also Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1306 (holding
that "a PRP does not have a claim for the recovery of the totality of its cleanup costs against other
PRPs, and a PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint and several liability").
210. Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1300.
211. Id. at 1301.
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for the orphan shares "equitably among all PRPs" under § 113.21 2 The
court explained that applying the joint and several approach to liability
for plaintiff-PRPs would be contrary to the purpose of CERCLA. 213 It
reasoned that if a court holds a group of defendant-PRPs "jointly and
severally liable for the total response costs incurred by a claimant-PRP,
reduced by the amount of claimant-PRP's own share, those defendant-
PRPs would [have to absorb] all of the cost attributable to 'orphan
shares.' ' 214 The United States Supreme Court denied Pinal's petition for
certiorari, thereby leaving the circuits to continue to decide the issue for
themselves.215
G. Eleventh Circuit
In Redwing Carriers Inc. v. Saraland Apartments.,216 Redwing
knowingly contaminated a site, which Saraland later acquired from sub-
sequent owners.21 7 Redwing consented to an administrative order of the
EPA under which Redwing would perform a remedial investigation of
218the contamination. Redwing conducted the investigation, incurring
almost $2 million in costs. 219 Redwing then sued Saraland under § 107(a)
and § 113(f) to recover some of those costs. 220 The court stated that in
order to bring a § 107(a) cost recovery action, Redwing would have to be
22 1innocent of contributing to the contamination, which it was not. There-
fore, the court concluded that Redwing's claim was one for contribution
under § 113(f) "as a matter of law. 222 The court stated that "when one
liable party sues another liable party under CERCLA, the action is not a
cost recovery action under § 107(a). Rather, it remains a claim for con-
tribution under § 113(f). 223
V. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co.
224
1. Facts
NutraSweet owned a food manufacturing plant in Illinois.225 X-L
Engineering ("X-L"), a machine shop, operated its business east of Nu-
212. Id. at 1303.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
216. 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
217. Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1494.
218. Id. at 1495.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1496.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1513.
224. 227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000).
225. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 780.
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traSweet's plant.226 NutraSweet ordered soil testing of vacant property to
the east of its land because it was considering expanding its plant.227 The
test showed high levels of hazardous waste near X-L's property.228 Nu-
traSweet then hired a company to more thoroughly assess the problem.229
This company determined that X-L could have caused the contamina-
tion. 230 NutraSweet then began to investigate. NutraSweet employees
saw an X-L employee dumping wastewater on the west side of X-L's
property, so NutraSweet sampled the water and found that it contained
hazardous substances. 231 It also took a soil sample from X-L's property
where the dumping occurred.232 This sample contained the same hazard-
ous substances found in the water.233 NutraSweet videotaped numerous
occasions where an X-L employee would dump wastewater next to Nu-
traSweet's property, as well as where the standing wastewater would
spill onto NutraSweet's property. 34 Therefore, NutraSweet requested
that the Illinois EPA and State Police begin surveillance of X-L. 235 The
State Police observed the dumping, tested the wastewater, which con-
tained hazardous substances, and confronted Paul Prikos, X-L's president
and principal shareholder owner.236 NutraSweet cleaned up its property
and then sued X-L Engineering and Prikos under CERCLA for improp-
erly disposing of the hazardous waste that contaminated NutraSweet's
property.237
2. Decision
The Seventh Circuit held that a landowner is strictly liable for haz-
ardous wastes located on his property under § 107(a) of CERCLA, but
that landowner may "seek contribution [under § 113(f)] from another
person who is liable or potentially liable under § 107. ' '238
The Seventh Circuit cited Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,239
where it held that under § 107(a)(B), any person, not only innocent par-
ties, may seek recovery of appropriate costs incurred in cleaning up a
hazardous waste site.240 The court also adopted the view that both § 107












237. Id. at 780-81.
238. Id. at 783-84 (quoting Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321,
326 (7th Cir. 1994)).
239. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994)
240. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
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. governs liability, while § 113(f) creates a mechanism for apportioning
that liability among responsible parties." 241
In Akzo, the EPA issued an administrative order that required emer-
gency removal activities at the landowner's facility.242 The landowner
cleaned the site, spending over $1.2 million.243 The landowner then sued
other PRPs under § 107(a). 244 The Seventh Circuit disallowed the §
107(a) action.245 In dicta, however, the court noted that the plaintiff could
have brought a cost recovery action if he had not actively contaminated
the site, thereby creating what courts in later cases have called the "inno-
cent landowner exception. '' 246 Therefore, a "landowner who, although
technically strictly liable for hazardous wastes on its property was inno-
cent of the contamination, would not have to bring a contribution action
under § 113(f) (because he did not contribute to the contamination); he
could instead bring a 'direct cost recovery action' under § 107(a) against
the responsible party., 247 The court, however, found that the exception
did not apply in Akzo and limited the plaintiff to a § 113(f) contribution
claim.
248
The NutraSweet court explained that a § 107(a) action is available
when "a landowner [is] forced to clean up hazardous materials that a
third party spilled onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent
lands., 249 The pivotal issue in this case was whether or not X-L released
the hazardous wastes found on NutraSweet's property.250 The Seventh
Circuit found X-L responsible for the hazardous waste on NutraSweet's
property. 251 NutraSweet was, therefore, entitled to recover its costs forcleaning up the hazardous waste from X-L.252
B. Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.
253
1. Facts
Plaintiff Rumpke purchased a contaminated landfill after the previ-
ous owners told it that they had never accepted hazardous waste at the
site.254 Rumpke then discovered that there had in fact been hazardous
241. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 27 F.3d
1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1994)).
242. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 762.
243. Id. at 762-63.
244. Id. at 764.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
248. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764.
249. NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784 (alteration in original) (quoting Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 792.
252. Id. at 780.
253. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
254. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236.
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wastes dumped at the site for several years.255 It cleaned the site
voluntarily.256 Much of the waste at the site came from a recycling cor-
poration no longer in business.2 57 Therefore, Rumpke brought a cost
claim action against the manufacturers who sent materials to the recy-
cling plant for processing.258 These manufacturers had already entered
into a settlement with the U.S. government and they argued that this
barred Rumpke from bringing suit under § 113(f)(2).259
2. Decision
The Seventh Circuit held that § 107(a) entitled Rumpke to bring a
cost recovery action against the manufacturers to recoup all costs in-
curred in the cleanup. 26 As discussed earlier, § 113(f)(2) only protects
parties from liability in § 113(f) suits relating to matters addressed in the
settlement. 26' Here, the settlement that Rumpke entered in to with the
U.S. government did not involve the issue of Rumpke's property.
262
The Seventh Circuit found that its holding in Akzo indicated that an
exception exists to the rule that PRPs can only bring actions for contribu-
tion.263 The court stated that "when two parties who both injured the
property have a dispute about who pays how much .... the statute di-
rects them to § 113(f) and only to § 1 13(f. ' 264 However, the court con-
tinued, "a class of cases might remain in which a PRP might sue under §
107(a). ' '265 The court concluded that there was "nothing in the language
of § 107(a) that would make it unavailable to a party suing to recover for
direct injury to its own land, under circumstances where it is not trying to
apportion costs. ' '266 Since Rumpke did not try to apportion costs between
itself and other PRPs, but instead tried to recoup costs for cleaning up
contamination that it alleged was caused by others, the court determined
that Rumpke could bring a § 107(a) claim.2 67 The court did not require




256. Id. at 1239.
257. Id. at 1236, 1237.
258. Id. at 1237, 1238.
259. Id. at 1237.
260. Id. at 1236.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).
262. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236.




267. Id. at 1241.
268. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543.
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VI. ANALYSIS
Courts currently adopt three distinct approaches to the issue of
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f). Almost all of the circuit courts of
appeals have aligned themselves with one of these views. Since
CERCLA litigation usually involves large sums of money, how previous
parties fared in court will affect how later parties handle and dispose of
hazardous waste and how later parties respond to contamination of their
own land. As discussed below, each view has serious implications for the
parties involved as well for the environment because each ruling directly
affects the motivation subsequent parties will have to initiate cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.
A. Majority View Courts
Under the first approach to the controversy, the majority of courts
hold that PRPs may only sue under § 113(f) for contribution and may not
sue under § 107(a) for cost recovery.269 The Tenth Circuit aligns itself
with the majority courts.27° Many courts that limit a PRP to a § 113(f)
claim do so based solely on the party's status as a PRP under the stat-
ute.271 This was the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Morrison and Colo-
rado Eastern.
272
In Morrison, the Tenth Circuit looked solely at Morrison's status as
a PRP in holding that Morrison could not pursue a § 107(a) cost recovery
claim to recoup its costs from McShares: "[B]ecause Morrison is a PRP,
it may . . . only proceed with an action for contribution under §
[1113(f)., 273 If the court had allowed Morrison to pursue a cost recovery
action, a PRP would have reaped the full advantages of § 107(a), an op-
tion the court believes does not comport with the incentives CERCLA
was intended to create.274 One activity CERCLA was intended to pro-
mote that would arguably be frustrated is expedient and voluntary
cleanup of contaminated sites by the polluter.275
However, courts can still act in accordance with the purposes of
CERCLA and not relegate PRPs to only § 113(f). The majority view's
narrow interpretation of the statute is not necessarily compatible with
CERCLA's language and it is a potential threat to CERCLA's policies.276
"[O]n its face, [§ 107(a)] grants standing to 'any . . . person' who has
269. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 107.
270. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002).
271. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 277.
272. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1133 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50
F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995).
273. See Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1135.
274. Id. at 1134.
275. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 121.
276. See Alexander, supra note 101, at 160.
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incurred necessary response costs" to clean up a site.277 Section 107(a)
,,278does not read "any innocent person. Also, Congress intended to cod-
ify existing case law in § 113(f).279 That existing case law consistently
interpreted § 107 broadly and found that it created a cause of action to
liable parties (PRPs) and non-liable parties alike. 8° If courts continue to
completely disallow cost recovery actions brought by PRPs, they will
virtually eliminate the right of private parties to seek joint and several
liability since these PRPs only receive judgments for several liability
under § 1 13(f).28
The unavailability of joint and several liability when a party is lim-
ited to a claim under § 113 can also deter cleanups by private parties.
2 82
When a court holds a defendant severally liable, the plaintiff may only
recoup a small fraction of his cleanup costs.283 In contrast, where a court
holds a defendant jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff can recoup all
the cleanup costs from one defendant.284 The plaintiff-PRP also absorbs
any orphan share costs when it brings a § 113(f) claim. 285 If a private
party knows how expensive, difficult, and perhaps impossible recovering
costs would be, that party will be less likely to settle with the government
or voluntarily initiate cleanup since it may be left "holding the bag" for
the majority of the cleanup costs. 286 The plaintiff-PRP may not even have
originally been responsible for many of those cleanup costs if it did not
contribute that share of the contamination to the site. Even if the PRP
does decide to perform the cleanup, it remains at a disadvantage with
respect to other PRPs because it cannot use the threat of joint and several
liability to bring other PRPs into negotiation.287 If a defendant-PRP faces
the possibility of a court holding it responsible for all the cleanup costs,
including outstanding orphan shares, it will willingly negotiate with the
plaintiff-PRP in order to minimize its liability and avoid litigation.88
Therefore, the inadvertent result of restricting PRPs' access to joint and
several liability gravely undermines the key CERCLA policy of encour-
aging settlement.289





282. Id. at 161.
283. Morrison, 302 F.3d at 1145.
284. Id. at 1134.
285. McCrory, supra note 51, at 24.
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B. Minority View Courts
Under the second interpretation of the controversy, the minority of
federal courts of appeals hold that PRPs may sue under § 107(a).29° Un-
der § 107, a "person" who spends money to clean a contaminated site
may sue other PRPs to recover those costs. 291 The definition of "person"
under CERCLA does not exclude PRPs who may also have contributed
to the contamination. 292 "Therefore, under a literal reading of the statute,
a PRP may bring a . .. [§] 107 cost recovery action against fellow
PRPs. '293 Similarly, under § 113, a "person" may seek contribution from
294those who are liable or potentially liable for contaminating a site.
Therefore, it appears that a PRP who incurred response costs may seek
recovery of its costs under § 107(a) or under § 113(f).295 This view still
remains consistent with cases before the SARA amendment that allowed
PRPs to bring cost recovery actions, as well as with the dicta in Key
Tronic.
2 96
When courts read the statute literally in this way, they create an ex-
ception to the majority court view. That exception allows PRPs substan-
tial leeway to bring cost recovery actions. If courts allow PRPs to bring §
107(a) claims, the result is that the plaintiff-PRPs can recover a joint and
several judgment against the defendants and shift all responsibility for
any orphan shares to defendants.297
The Seventh Circuit adheres to this view.29 a This circuit determines
liability based on whether or not a party qualifies as a PRP.29 9 However,
the circuit mitigates that liability somewhat according to the circum-
stances in each case. 300 The circumstances that might mitigate a party's
liability include: whether or not the party was a PRP by virtue of its
status as a landowner; whether the PRP actively contributed to the con-
tamination; and the PRP's knowledge of the contamination before it ac-
quired the property. 0 '
290. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 110.
291. See Buckley, supra note 3, at 851.
292. Buckley, supra note 3, at 851; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000) ("The term "person"
means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commer-
cial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body.").
293. Buckley, supra note 3, at 851.
294. Id. at 852.
295. Id.
296. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 110.
297. Id. at I 11.
298. See NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 30 F.3d 761, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1994).
299. See NutraSweet, 30 F.3d at 783-84.
300. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 281 (quoting Rumpke of nd., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.,
107 F.3d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also McGuire, supra note 24, at 545 (explaining that the
court relied on the assumption that Rumpke purchased the land without knowledge of the contamina-
tion and that all of the contamination had already occurred (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239)).
301. See Wertman, supra note 4, at 281 (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239); see also
McGuire, supra note 24, at 545 (explaining that the court relied on the assumption that Rumpke
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In NutraSweet, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its adoption of the mi-
nority view.30 2 It stated that under § 107, "any person" may sue to recoup
cleanup costs, including, under a literal reading of the statute, PRPs. °3
The court recognized the statute's strict liability, but mitigated Nu-
traSweet's liability to zero because NutraSweet was a PRP and land-
owner that did not actively contribute to the contamination.3° In
Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit again mitigated the PRP's liability because
Rumpke did not actually participate in the contamination, his ignorance
of the existence of the pollution, and his voluntary cleanup of the site.
305
"Innocent" parties may bring § 107(a) claims.30 6 However, a PRP
must successfully assert one of the established affirmative defenses un-
der § 107(b) to establish its innocence.30 7 Neither the NutraSweet nor the
Rumpke court required the plaintiffs involved to establish such a defense
before declaring them an "innocent" party.308 The court in each case al-
lowed the circumstances of the case-to mitigate the plaintiff-PRP's liabil-
ity.
3°9
The Seventh Circuit's approach does not adhere to CERCLA's strict
liability scheme. It allows PRPs to escape PRP status despite the clear
definition of PRP in the statute. 310 Lack of knowledge of contamination
before purchasing land, lack of actual participation in the contamination,
and the voluntariness of the cleanup should not factor in to determine
whether or not a party fits the definition of a PRP because these factors
are missing from the statute's definition of a PRP.311 Courts determining
which section, § 107(a) or § 113(f), though, may minimize the effect of a
party's PRP status without running afoul of CERCLA; a PRP may sue
other PRPs under § 113 in order to recoup cleanup costs.
C. The Third View
Under the third approach to the controversy, courts hold that PRPs
may bring a § 107(a) cost recovery claim, but then determine liability as
if the claim were for contribution under § 113(f).31 2 The courts do not
treat the claims like governmental cost recovery claims.31 3 Unlike the
government, the plaintiffs cannot establish joint and several liability and
purchased the land without knowledge of the contamination and that all of the contamination had
already occurred (quoting Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239)).
302. See NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 784.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 792.
305. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543.
306. Id. at 551; see Glanvill, supra note 31, at 162.
307. McGuire, supra note 25, at 551-52.
308. Id. at 543; see NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 783-86.
309. McGuire, supra note 25, at 543; see NutraSweet, 227 F.3d at 785-86.
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining PRP).
311. See id.
312. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 112.
313. Id.
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shift all liability, including responsibility for any orphan shares, to the
defendants.314 Instead, these courts allocate costs, including orphan
shares, among PRPs.
315
The courts that adopt the third view take one of two approaches.316
Under the first approach, a court applies § 107(a) to determine whether
liability exists, and § 113(f) to apportion liability.31 7 Courts following the
second approach explicitly affirm the right of a PRP to bring a cost re-
covery action due to the plain language of § 107(a)(4)(B), but then ap-
portion responsibility among all parties, not just the defendants, for any
orphan shares.318 Under this view, no one, including the plaintiff, collects
more from another party than the other party's equitably apportioned
share.319 So, even though these courts interpret CERCLA differently than
the majority view courts, they achieve essentially the same result because
of the way that they allocate liability.
320
When courts combine § 107(a) and § 113(0, they seem to solve the
statutory interpretation problem associated with limiting standing under §
107 because the PRP still brings the action under § 107(a) during the
initial phase of litigation.32' But this does not solve the policy questions
raised by limiting joint and several liability in the second phase of litiga-
tion, cost apportionment.322 Under this approach, courts do not allow §
107 and § 113 to fulfill their separate functions.323 As the Supreme Court
noted in Key Tronic, and as the different statutes of limitations for the
two sections demonstrate, these provisions provide distinct causes of
action.324 Also, a court does not have to apportion liability when an ac-
tion is brought under § 107(a).325 If the harm is not divisible, the plaintiff
will usually obtain a judgment for joint and several liability, allowing the
plaintiff to shift all liability to any defendant.326 If the defendant never
brings a claim for contribution in response to a plaintiffs claim under §





317. Id. at 111-12.
318. Id. at 112.
319. Ann Alexander, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Relationship Between
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320. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 112-13.
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322. Id.
323. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 96-97.
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VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY
A. Cost Recovery for Parties Who Initially Clean a Site
Joint and several liability is the key to CERCLA's success. A better
solution, therefore, would determine which plaintiffs most need joint and
several liability "as a matter of practicality and sound policy," and allow
those plaintiffs to bring § 107(a) actions, entitling them to collect all of
their costs from the many defendants.328
Courts would allow a § 107(a) claim for only those parties who per-
form a cleanup themselves and incur necessary remediation costs.
32 9
Only money directly spent to remediate a site, and not money paid to
reimburse another party who performed remediation, would be included
in necessary costs. 33 "This approach [would] preserve[] the integrity of
the broad language of § 107, while permitting effective resolution of the
policy dilemma inherent in defining standing under that section., 33' This
approach would also encourage private parties to enter into settlement
agreements by shifting the risks of uncertain liability and uncollected
costs to those who refused to actively participate in the cleanup.
332
Commentators also favor using this approach when a PRP voluntar-
ily remediates a site.333 Even though the PRP remains partially responsi-
ble for the contamination at the site, its voluntary cleanup is the exact
conduct that Congress invited by enacting CERCLA and the statute
should be used to reward the PRP.334 Allowing the PRP to bring a §
107(a) claim will provide an incentive for other PRPs to voluntarily
remediate sites, thereby furthering a primary goal of CERCLA. 335 The
reward for voluntary cleanups would be a joint and several judgment
against other PRPs. 33 6 Courts should encourage expedient, voluntary
remediation of hazardous waste and allocate cleanup costs equitably by
requiring the defendant-PRPs alone to bear responsibility for orphan
shares.33 7 If a court forces the PRP who voluntarily cleaned the site to
pay part of the orphan shares, then PRPs in subsequent cases will have
almost no incentive to cleanup sites voluntarily, since they will bear
more than the cost of their own contamination.338
It would also be inconsistent for a court to require the PRP who
cleaned the site to pay part of the orphan shares, while imposing joint





333. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 121; Pearce, supra note 15, at 136-37.
334. Hemandez, supra note 13, at 121.
335. Id.
336. id. at 113.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 122-23.
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and several judgment on the PRPs who did not participate in the
cleanup. 339 The PRP who cleaned the site bore the entire responsibility
for the cleanup and paid the shares of all PRPs.34 It would, therefore, be
inequitable to shift part of those orphan shares back to the PRP who
cleaned the site.341 Furthermore, shifting all costs to the other PRPs
serves the goal of imposing costs on those responsible for the pollu-
tion.342
B. Contribution Claims Only for Parties Who Do Not Participate in
Cleanup
Under another proposed solution, if a PRP does not clean the site,
but simply seeks to share liability imposed on him, the PRP may only
bring a § 113(f) action for contribution. 343 PRPs who did not clean the
site have not incurred any response costs.344 These PRPs are, therefore,
suing to reallocate the liability already imposed on them, the essence of a
claim for contribution, and should not be allowed to bring a cost recov-
ery claim. 345 All PRPs, including the PRP who sues, will be proportion-
ately liable for the cleanup costs, including any orphan shares.
If courts allow PRPs who did not participate in the cleanup to bring
cost recovery actions, § 107(a) and § 113(f) will be interchangeable.347 In
that situation, plaintiffs would always prefer a § 107(a) claim because it
offers joint and several liability.348 No one would ever bring a claim un-
der § 113(f).349 Congress did not intend this interpretation because it
would make § 113(f) meaningless.350
C. Cost Recovery or Contribution for Parties Ordered to Clean a Site
A third solution is to allow a PRP to bring either a cost recovery ac-
tion or a contribution claim when the PRP is compelled to clean a site,
for example, by order of the EPA.351 This approach is consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of CERCLA.352 In Key Tronic, the
Court said: "[CERCLA] expressly authorizes a cause of action for con-
tribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat over-
lapping remedy in § 107."353 Section 107(a) does not specify that only
339. Id. at 123.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 122, 123.
342. Id. at 123.
343. Id. at 114-15.
344. Id. at 114.
345. Id. at 114-15.
346. See id. at 116.
347. Id. at 115.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 115, 116.
351. Id. at 124.
352. Id.
353. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
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innocent parties and parties who clean a site voluntarily may seek cost
recovery. As long as the PRP meets the requirements of § 107(a), the
PRP may bring a cost recovery claim.
355
A claim for contribution should also be available to a PRP who is
ordered to clean a site.356 In this situation, the PRP was not only obli-
gated to clean the site, but the PRP also incurred costs that he can recoup
through a contribution claim.357 Regardless of the nature of the claim,
however, courts should require plaintiff-PRPs to pay a portion of the
orphan shares.358 The result would be equitable.359 In addition, distribut-
ing liability for the orphan shares in this situation would create a power-
ful incentive for other PRPs to clean up sites promptly and voluntarily.
360
Only then would PRPs avoid paying a portion of any orphan shares.36'
CONCLUSION
Persuasive policy considerations support allowing PRPs to bring
cost recovery actions, with the resulting benefits inducing PRPs in a po-
sition to cleanup a Superfund site to so act. A plaintiff-PRP who is al-
lowed to bring a cost recovery claim can recover a joint and several
judgment against the defendants and shift full responsibility for any or-
phan shares.362 If a plaintiff-PRP can choose to sue under either § 107(a)
or § 113(f), he can still control the lawsuit, "evaluating the potential for
prevailing on a cost recovery claim based on the 'innocence' of his ac-
,,363tions.
The solutions described in this survey demonstrate that there is a
middle ground between the views of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits.
Both of the circuits attempt to remain true to the purposes of CERCLA.
The Tenth Circuit does that by barring a liable party, a PRP, from recov-
ering all costs under § 107(a) when that party is responsible for some of
the costs.3 64 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit adheres to judicial
interpretations of CERCLA before it was amended by SARA, which
conclude that a PRP may have standing under § 107(a).365 However,
courts that adopt the proposed solutions discussed herein will more fully
354. Hernandez, supra note 13, at 124.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 124-25.
358. Id. at 125.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 126.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 111.
363. Glanvill, supra note 31, at 179.
364. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132-36 (10th Cir. 2002).
365. See Hernandez, supra note 13, at 96; see also NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 227 F.3d
776, 784 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing previous cases where the Seventh Circuit stated that a PRP could sue
under § 107).
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satisfy Congress's intent-that responsible parties cleanup polluted sites
quickly and voluntarily.
This controversy has been long-standing. The solutions proposed in
this survey might assist courts in adopting more equitable and practical
solutions for the parties that come before them. This complicated issue
requires courts to thoroughly understand the nature of the controversy. It
is unlikely that majority view courts will adopt any of the proposed solu-
tions because of the entrenched precedent. Therefore, to resolve the issue
for all courts, Congress needs to amend CERCLA to clarify the issue of
standing under § 107(a) and § 113(f) or the Supreme Court needs to de-
cide a case directly on point.
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